








































































Many of today’s open source software (OSS) communities operate beneath an umbrella organization, 
while others are organized entirely independently, and yet others follow a strategy somewhere in 
between, sharing certain resources and services. In our paper, we analyze four mature OSS 
communities (GENIVI, PolarSys, LibreOffice and PostgreSQL) representing different organizational 
forms. Our qualitative case studies illustrate that OSS communities preferring to control all of their 
resources are organized autonomously, while those focused mainly on software development are 
integrated into an umbrella organization. An interjacent strategy is pursued by OSS communities 
affiliated with an intermediary form of organization that takes care of legal and financial issues, 
without prescribing organizational structures or a specific license. The findings of our case studies 
show that there is no one-size-fits-all approach for OSS communities and each strategy has specific 
advantages and disadvantages. Arguing with the theoretical concepts of Resource Dependence Theory 
(RDT) and Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), we are able to relate the findings of our qualitative 
empirical study to theoretical concepts explaining different organizational behavior. Therefore, this 
study contributes new insights concerning the inter-organizational affiliations of OSS communities 
thus responding to the question why different forms of OSS community governance exist. 
 






The development of software according to the principles of Open Source Software (OSS) represents a 
frequently used alternative to developing proprietary software. Following the open source route has 
several consequences and peculiarities regarding organizational characteristics. The structural 
evolution of an OSS community is described by de Laat (2007) as a three-phase model. In phase one, 
governance is spontaneous and explicit coordination and control are non-existent. In phase two, 
internal governance with formal tools is introduced, e.g. division of roles, training, modularization or 
decision-making. This enables an OSS community to be governed internally in order to increase 
efficiency and effectiveness as the community grows. Eventually, in phase three, if the OSS 
community is successful and companies or other organizations want to participate, such an 
involvement of outside parties needs to be institutionalized. In this final stage, a legal entity like a 
non-profit foundation is established in order to protect developers, the OSS community itself, and to 
enhance collaboration (Riehle, 2010; Riehle and Berschneider, 2012). 
 As an OSS community matures, its leaders have to decide whether to continue the community 
as it is, to create their own foundation or to join an existing foundation (Riehle and Berschneider, 
2012). The benefits of OSS foundations for their communities are manifold (Riehle, 2010). One 
frequently cited argument for a foundation is that it can act as a legal representative of the community. 
It can defend its interests in court and protect members from individual liability (O’Mahony and 
Bechky, 2008; Riehle, 2010; Riehle and Berschneider, 2012). A foundation also increases a 
community’s credibility and makes it less dependent on specific individuals and organizations (Riehle 
and Berschneider, 2012). In addition, OSS foundations provide a wide range of services to their 
communities. Eckert (2017) gives a list of OSS foundations and the various services they offer. 
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 While many mature OSS communities are part of a foundation because of the services they 
provide (Eckert, 2017), studies are needed contributing to an explanation of why some OSS 
communities are part of an umbrella organization while others choose to remain entirely independent. 
OSS communities have to decide on their governance structure in order to satisfy the expectations of 
today’s OSS developer and user community. Professional software users require more than just the 
code of an OSS project: they need compliance with software licenses, legal assurances that there are 
no Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) infringements, knowledge-sharing events, reputational visibility 
of the software they are using and more. While there are good arguments in favor of joining a 
foundation, some mature OSS communities remain completely independent. Various characteristics 
of OSS foundations have already been examined (Riehle and Berschneider, 2012). However, so far no 
in-depth comparison regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the inter-organizational 
affiliations of OSS communities has been developed. Why do such different forms of mature OSS 
communities exist? Is it possible to derive an explanation of the different configurations by a theory-
based approach? 
Our article attempts to fill this gap by answering the following two research questions: 
RQ1: What are the different forms of inter-organizational affiliations of OSS communities? 
RQ2: What are the arguments for and against the different forms of inter-organizational affiliations 
of OSS communities? 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of related 
literature on OSS foundations, as well as research on organizational theories, specifically two 
economic management theories: Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) and Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE). In Section 3 we explain our research method, and in Section 4 our case studies and 
their main findings are presented. The results of the case studies, their limitations and impact as well 




In order to better understand the context of our research questions, the following section introduces 
previous research on OSS foundations and relevant theories helping to clarify theoretical explanations 
of organizational strategies. 
 
2.1 Research on OSS Foundations 
As the literature review by Manikas and Hansen (2013) points out, research on software ecosystems 
began in 2010. In an update Manikas (2016) identifies business and management issues as important 
aspects. Both reviews highlight the need for governance of a software ecosystem. OSS foundations 
support the development of such governance for a single community as well as for several 
communities simultaneously. 
 One of the reasons for the existence of OSS foundations is their provision of legal protection 
for OSS communities and their contributors. O’Mahony (2003) has identified seven primary tactics by 
which OSS communities can guard their work against proprietary appropriation and protect their 
collective identity and reputation. Those tactics include licenses, individual liability, the holding of 
assets, trademarks and brands. All seven tactics are best established by a foundation. The first legal 
institutions to represent and protect technical communities have started already in the late 70’s and 
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80’s (O’Mahony, 2005). The earliest specifically OSS related legal association was "Software in the 
Public Interest" (SPI), founded in 1997. 
 In addition to legal protection, OSS foundations may also provide financial benefits. Riehle 
(2010) shows financial reasons behind software firms joining or supporting OSS foundations. Some 
members expect cost savings for products built on the OSS platform, others expect increased revenues 
from complementary products, while some support OSS foundations in order to increase their target 
market. Moreover, Riehle demonstrates that the responsibilities of an OSS foundation may go beyond 
financial and legal considerations: the foundation may also be responsible for establishing a strategy 
for the software, organizing the community and advertising the software. 
 The activities of such OSS foundations are diverse. According to Markus (2007), governance 
of OSS communities can be grouped into six categories of formal and informal structures and rules: 
ownership of assets; chartering of the community; community management; software development 
process; conflict resolution and rule changing; and use of information and tools. All six structures and 
rules can be part of an OSS foundation, bundling the collaborative effort of one or more OSS 
communities. In addition, the nature of OSS foundations is dynamic. Currie, Kelty and Murillo (2013) 
have described that OSS communities follow trajectories from informal “Organized Publics” towards 
“Formal Social Enterprises” (e.g. in the case of Linux) and in the opposite direction (e.g. in the case 
of OpenOffice). 
 In recent years, a number of OSS foundations has allowed existing OSS communities to join 
so they could benefit from the foundation’s range of services such as their legal entity and potential 
cost savings (Eckert, 2017). For example, since 2008, the Linux Foundation has provided services as 
umbrella organization in order to govern collaborative OSS communities. Such services include the 
provision of IT-infrastructure and a legal framework, as well as sharing expertise in the OSS 
environment (The Linux Foundation, 2017). Another organization offering similar services to 
industry-specific OSS communities is the Eclipse Foundation. Its integrated communities, so-called 
‘working groups’, benefit from governance and development practices, IPR-management, IT-
infrastructure, and marketing channels. The Eclipse Foundation’s first working group, PolarSys, is 
one of the OSS communities included in our study. 
 Eckert (2017) presents an organizational framework allowing the comparison between OSS 
communities and organizations. According to this framework, the services provided by a foundation 
to its integrated communities are structured in the three main categories of people, organization and 
assets. A recent study by Lindman and Hammouda (2018) found additional support mechanisms by 
governance entities. In particular, they describe the important role of the support entity during the 
incubation process of a new portfolio project. Such an incubation phase is useful for the members of 
the community to learn the foundation’s norms and processes. 
 Riehle and Berschneider (2012) have introduced a model of OSS developer foundations based 
on six categories: general, philosophy, intellectual property (IP), governance, financing and 
operations. These categories provide attributes allowing OSS community leaders to compare existing 
foundations with their needs or to design their own foundation. The model was applied to nine 
foundations and presents an overview comparing existing foundations and showing the structures and 
properties of OSS foundations. Moreover, the model can be used to design such a foundation. 
 Previous research on OSS foundations has focused on the reasons for their existence and the 
benefits communities get from them. However, as Riehle and Berschneider (2012) point out, joining 
an existing foundation is only one alternative. OSS communities wishing to incorporate as a legal 
entity can also set up their own foundation. So far it is not clear how OSS communities decide which 
option to take and why different configurations exist. Since these questions have not yet been 
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addressed thoroughly in previous research on OSS we have looked into related research on 
organizational governance.  
2.2. Research on Organizational Theories 
There are numerous theories explaining collaboration and control among organizations (Gray and 
Wood, 1991; Rossignoli and Ricciardi, 2015). To identify possibly relevant approaches, we have 
examined the literature on non-profit organizations (NPOs) and their reasons for collaboration with 
other legal entities. We decided to look at NPOs because we perceive some similarities between the 
organization of OSS communities and NPOs. Most notably, both are not profit- but interest-driven 
and rely strongly on voluntary service. Research on NPO collaboration emphasizes the importance of 
the Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) and Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) as the main 
explanatory approach for the collaboration of different legal entities. These theories point out the 
usefulness of a partnership to increase organizational resources or to reduce the need to compete for 
resources (Gazley and Brudney, 2007; Grønbjerg, 1993; Guo and Acar, 2005; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Saidel, 1994). In the following subsections, we therefore sum up research on RDT and TCE. 
 
2.2.1 Resource Dependence Theory 
RDT argues that organizations depend on resources originating not from within themselves but from 
their environment. The resources required by one organization may be in the hand of other 
organizations. Consequently, formally independent organizations can nevertheless depend on one 
another because of their possession of, or need for, certain resources. From this perspective, resources 
represent a source of power. Organization A’s power over organization B is equal to organization B’s 
dependence on organization A’s resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This dependence of an 
organization reflects an uncertainty regarding resources. 
 In response to this uncertainty in their resource environment, RDT suggests that organizations 
should collaborate to secure critical resources. Collaboration facilitates the acquisition of critical 
resources and, consequently, reduces uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However, such 
collaboration is not without cost. The greatest expense of developing collaborative activities is 
arguably the loss of operating autonomy (Provan, 1984). Formal types of collaboration allow better 
control of critical resources, yet these relationships are almost always accompanied by a greater loss 
of autonomy and thus involve relatively higher costs in terms of managerial autonomy (Zuckerman 
and D’Aunno, 1990). Nevertheless, organizations are often willing to surrender a degree of autonomy 
in exchange for a better chance at resource sufficiency.  
 A key challenge for any organization choosing among different forms of collaboration is 
retaining the dynamic balance between managing resource dependence and sustaining organizational 
autonomy. Recognizing the necessity of inter-organizational relationships to acquire resources, the 
focus is on minimizing inter-organizational dependencies while preserving the autonomy of the 
organization (Gray and Wood, 1991). Murray (1998) has argued that the degree of interdependence 
between the parties is key to understanding the difference in forms of collaboration: at one end of the 
continuum in interdependence is the simple one-time transaction, in which one organization 
exchanges something with the other; at the other end is the full legal merger of the two organizations. 
In order of decreasing autonomy and increasing formality interdependence ranges from collaboration, 
through alliances to integration, parent subsidiary, joint venture, and merger. One of the most 
common ways to gain control is by acquiring all relevant resources and merging them into one single 
organization (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Hillman et al., 2009). 
 These theoretical insights may be transferred to OSS communities. By its very nature, an OSS 
community is a permeable, constantly altering organization with little control over its key resources, 
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such as the developer community or project funding (O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008; Alexy et al., 
2013). Existing foundations already have a community with various roles and tasks. Independent 
communities may therefore hope to grow and gain access to new skills and sources of capital by 
joining an OSS foundation. Moreover, the increased visibility or legitimacy could lead to more 
donations. On the other hand, by joining an existing foundation OSS communities surrender some of 
their autonomy. 
 Concerning the control of resources within OSS communities, the role of software firms is 
relevant. Within the Eclipse environment Schaarschmidt, Walsh and Kortzfleisch (2015) found that 
firms are able to influence OSS development by two resource-based options: Either by exerting 
control through leadership (e.g. hiring existing community leaders) or by deploying resources to the 
project (e.g. assigning more firm-sponsored committers). These examples illustrate the importance of 
resource-based control within OSS communities. 
 
2.2.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
TCE focuses on transactions between market partners and the cost associated with these transactions. 
From the perspective of an organization, the acquisition of a particular commodity may be from its 
own resources (hierarchy) or from external suppliers (market). The decision as to which of the two 
options is most advantageous depends on the transaction cost associated with both of these options. 
Consequently, different organizational structures may result (Williamson, 1975). There are three 
critical dimensions characterizing transactions: the frequency of transactions, the degree to which 
long-lasting transaction-specific investments are incurred, and uncertainty related to the transactions 
(Williamson, 1979).  
 Frequency is important because the cost of a specialized hierarchy will be easier to recover for 
transactions of a recurrent nature. More frequent transactions thus tend to be organized within the 
hierarchy (Williamson, 1984). In the context of OSS this may be illustrated by companies donating 
money in order to create or maintain a relationship with an OSS community (Dahlander and 
Magnusson, 2005). Also individuals who use OSS donate money to support the community. As a 
result, many communities offer the option of donations. The processes involved with donations, such 
as bookkeeping and issuing tax exemption statements for donors, occur frequently. Those processes 
are highly standardized per country, occur often and do not require transaction-specific knowledge. In 
general, legal changes applicable to bookkeeping and the issuing of tax exemption statements do not 
occur very often and uncertainty is rather low. Therefore, donation management and bookkeeping are 
typical services that may be outsourced to OSS foundations. 
 Transaction-specific investments are seen as the most important of the three critical 
dimensions. If investments are specific to particular transactions, they are lost when those transactions 
cease to be relevant (Williamson, 1981). Therefore, transactions related to highly specific investments 
tend to be organized in hierarchy. For example, engineers and lawyers possess valuable skills; 
however, unless these skills are deepened and tailored to a particular employer, neither employee nor 
employer have a specific interest in maintaining a continuing employment relationship, because the 
employer can hire a substitute without losing human-asset-specific knowledge. Firm-specific 
knowledge, in contrast, may be highly specific and, therefore, non-transferable. In this case, the 
employment relationship is a source of added value (Williamson, 1981). 
 Uncertainty is related either to environmental uncertainty or behavioral uncertainty (e.g. 
opportunistic behavior) and their impact on transactions. The incentive to shift transactions from 
markets to hierarchy increases as uncertainty grows because the cost of harmonization varies directly 
with the need to adjust to changing circumstances (Williamson, 1981).  
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3. Method 
For this paper we have used an exploratory case study approach to answer the research questions. As 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2003) have shown, case studies facilitate an in-depth view of certain 
situations, allowing the identification of causal relationships and underlying motivations. Moreover, 
exploratory research strives to find out what is happening, seeking new insights and generating ideas 
and hypotheses for new research (Runeson and Höst, 2009). 
 To analyze the case studies we have adopted a grounded theory approach because it is well 
suited for emergent or poorly understood phenomena. This method provides the broadest possible 
contextual information to understand a phenomenon lacking a theory (Corbin and Strauss, 2014), thus 
allowing us to identify the different motivations behind decisions of OSS communities.   
 Recently, grounded theory has been applied particularly in software engineering research in 
order to explore the human and social aspects in such technical context (Hoda et al., 2012). In their 
review of almost 100 grounded theory studies in software engineering Stol, Ralph and Fitzgerald 
(2016) found a strong increase of this methodological approach since 2005. They also identified 
different strands of grounded theory. In this study we follow the classic approach by Barney G. Glaser 
(1992), starting with open coding of the case study interviews and later conducting an extensive 
literature review leading to the existing RDT and TCE theories described above. 
 
3.1 Case Selection 
In grounded theory, sampling serves theory construction and not representativeness (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2014). Unlike random sampling, we have chosen the approach of maximum variation of 
cases; therefore, the analyzed OSS communities display distinct characteristics and processes 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). All of the studied communities have evolved in a highly competitive business-
driven environment but have adopted different organizational strategies. 
We chose to analyze two communities from the vertical software area where software is 
specific to one particular branch of industry: GENIVI and PolarSys. The GENIVI Alliance is an 
autonomous OSS community without any association to a higher-level OSS organization, whereas 
PolarSys is integrated into the Eclipse Foundation. In addition, we also chose to analyze two 
communities active in the horizontal software market where the same software is used across different 
industries: LibreOffice and PostgreSQL. Both communities are associated with Software in the Public 
Interest (SPI). SPI is a NPO founded to help organizations develop and distribute open hardware and 
software (O’Mahony, 2005). Its mission is to help free and open source software communities by 
handling their non-technical administrative tasks relieving them from the burden of operating their 
own legal entities. 
 
3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
Multiple sources of data are critical to grounded theory as they enable triangulation and validation of 
theoretical constructs. Therefore, the four case studies are mainly based on two different data sources: 
semi-structured interviews with key representatives of the OSS communities (Appendix 1) and 
publicly accessible governance documents (Appendix 2). In order to better describe the case studies, 
some scientific literature has been analyzed as well. 
We have conducted 16 interviews with 14 different stakeholders (two representatives were 
interviewed twice to deepen the insight) following a list of questions related to our research focus 
(Appendix 3). All interviews were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using MAXQDA, a Computer 
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Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), to conceptualize the interview transcripts 
(Bringer et al., 2006). In addition, we analyzed publicly accessible legal and organizational documents 
from GENIVI, PolarSys, LibreOffice, PostgreSQL, SPI and the Eclipse Foundation to verify 
statements in the interviews and identify new aspects relating to IPR protection, community 
organization, members’ rights, and financial aspects. 
 Using MAXQDA, we have identified a number of different topics with various attributes. In 
order to capture meanings and intentions in our data, we first made an initial coding in an open 
fashion. The process of open coding begins with a line-by-line analysis to identify substantive codes 
emergent within the data. Line-by-line coding forced us to verify and saturate codes, minimising the 
chance of missing an important code and ensuring that nothing had been left out (Glaser and Holton, 
2007). We then examined the data again in order to find other text passages that fell within the code. 
In this way, we were able to identify basic ideas and concepts. After the initial coding, we discussed 
and compared the identified concepts. Where codes were close to each other, we determined their 
adequacy for larger segments or refined them as necessary. As an example, we refined the code “cost” 
by splitting it into different kinds of cost. We then built categories of codes structuring similar 
concepts – in our case, the advantage or disadvantage of a decision, such as high initial cost or costly 
overheads. Following on from this, we tried to establish how the different categories fit into a 
coherent picture. This is presented in the following section. 
 
4. Case Studies and Main Findings 
The following sections summarize our findings. Each case is introduced by a short history of the 
community and its challenges, the decision regarding inter-organizational affiliation in order to solve 
problems and reasons for this decision. Quotes from the interviewees are identified with the person’s 
number (see Appendix 1). At the end of the paragraphs, the core argument is formulated in 
parentheses. The analysis of the resulting advantages and disadvantages of the respective choice of 
affiliation is presented in the final section of this chapter.  
In order to illustrate the types of affiliation and relationship between the organizations and their OSS 
projects, Figure 1 provides an overview of the four communities and shows the three approaches. The 
term “Legal entity” defines a legally independent organization, “OSS community” refers to the social 
entity of contributors (humans), and “OSS project” concerns the technical entity (source code). Since 
PostgreSQL in fact has multiple legal entities, Figure 1 represents a simplification in this regard. 
 
 




4.1 The Case of GENIVI 
Increasing customer demand, driven especially by the rapidity of changes in consumer electronic 
devices such as smartphones, has led to increased functionality of vehicle software stacks. In 
response, specialized suppliers developed automotive software, e.g. an In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) 
system. Although functional needs did not vary much between different automotive manufacturers, 
they became dependent on particular vendors of software development because of long-term 
contracts. “Up to that point, they were dependent on vendors […] as their suppliers. They wanted to 
be able to bring the box that they purchased from their [suppliers] and be able to distribute the 
development of that box to multiple partners and create more competition in this market” (P14). Due 
to their common needs, the market players expected to be able to develop commodity software and 
bring it to market as quickly and cheaply as possible without dependence on a single vendor. By 
sharing development cost and releasing the software produced under an OSS license, automotive 
manufacturers would reduce their dependence on one specific software provider. However, the 
different automotive manufacturers as well as software and hardware providers had to make a 
decision on how to organize this collaboration. 
Decision: In 2009, BMW together with eight other founding members comprising automotive 
manufacturers, suppliers and software, middleware and hardware providers established GENIVI, a 
new non-profit corporation. GENIVI's first goal was to advance software development in the 
automotive industry via the use of a dynamic reusable In-Vehicle Infotainment (IVI) OSS 
development platform. The GENIVI Alliance’s long-term goals were – and still are – to shorten the 
development cycle reducing time-to-market and cost.  
Reasons for this decision: As one interviewee stated (P14), the founding members of the GENIVI 
Alliance were aware that they could work together with an existing OSS foundation. However, they 
did not want to depend on another organization. As a new non-profit corporation, GENIVI could build 
everything from scratch, free from the constraints of existing organizational structures or processes. 
Moreover, since none of the existing foundations had specific knowledge of the automotive sector, 
this decision was favored by a strong common ground of a number of companies having the required 
business skills and sharing the same business understanding. Thus, none of the involved parties had to 
first establish this base together with an existing OSS foundation. 
Analysis of this decision (advantages): The founders of GENIVI did not want to be controlled by 
another organization. By building a new non-profit corporation, they were not bound to any higher-
level regulations issued elsewhere. The founding members were thus free to decide on the scope, 
governance structure, technical standards, and processes (individual organizational structures). 
 GENIVI was not bound to any given process and was able to create everything from scratch. 
E.g. because contributions come from different employees from various organizations in daily 
competition, the intellectual property rights management was highly complex. “One of the significant 
challenges was the licensing of the open source software, it was done in at least 30 different ways” 
(P14). Policies and processes had to be constructed to fit this scenario. In GENIVI, about ten people 
with different educational backgrounds are involved in license reviewing and, depending on the 
workload, sometimes even more people are needed. There are two ways to contribute to software: 
either the source code conforms already to the project’s OSS license, or the source code is made 
public under a different OSS license via the contributor license agreement. As one interviewee stated, 
“GPL v3 to this date is still a forbidden license within the automotive community in general” (P14). 
Consequently, GENIVI made a clear statement on which licenses are allowed within its projects and 
which are prohibited (GENIVI, 2014). GENIVI distinguishes between green, orange and red 
categories of license. Green licenses have been reviewed by GENIVI and are accepted as suitable 
without restrictions, red licenses have been reviewed and rejected while orange licenses have been 
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reviewed by GENIVI and are accepted as suitable only under certain conditions. Presently, a GENIVI 
project can choose among a number of accepted OSS licenses (individual organizational processes). 
 GENIVI is an alliance in which all members already have a common ground and the required 
business skills relevant to software development in the automotive sector. Although some of the 
members involved are in daily competition, they identify themselves strongly with the community as 
a result of the common business understanding (strong identification with the community). 
Analysis of this decision (disadvantages): GENIVI first had to build its supporting processes and 
legal structures before it could focus on software development. In the early stages, the majority of 
GENIVI’s membership fees went to various processes other than actual software development. As 
one interviewee stated, “A lot of the members were frustrated because the original charter of the 
GENIVI alliance was that 70% of the membership-dues that were collected would be contributed to 
developing software. But in reality, in the early days, it was more like 10%” (P14). Building a legal 
structure and processes is time-consuming and resource-intensive (high initial cost). 
 In order for its projects to work together, GENIVI has to coordinate various processes, such as 
membership processing, financial management and the provision of an infrastructure for 
collaboration. Coordinating all these new processes is time consuming and leads to large overheads. 
Thus, initially at least, more resources had to be spent on organizational overhead of the new 
organization than on software development (costly overheads). 
 Building the new legal entity of GENIVI was not only time-consuming and cost intensive, it 
also carried additional organizational risks. GENIVI first had to create the structures and processes, 
then to allocate the human resources necessary to provide the services. Furthermore, GENIVI had to 
establish its own bylaws, which then had to be accepted by the founding members. This took more 
than a year and involved a number of legal issues, as well as other administrative tasks (organizational 
risk). 
 
4.2 The Case of the Document Foundation and LibreOffice 
In 2010, core members of the OpenOffice.org community created a fork of the project because they 
no longer agreed with the community’s governance. As stated by Gamalielsson and Lundell (2014) 
“Concerns amongst community members include perceptions on: vendor dominance, copyright 
assignment, lack of influence, lack of fun, and bureaucracy in the project.” As stated in one interview 
(P6), community members wanted to create something new, independent from other organizations 
and stable over time, where a single corporate sponsor did not decide the fate of the community. They 
wanted to create a stable legal framework that would give its members the right to decide on the 
future of the community based on meritocracy. 
Decision: The Document Foundation (TDF) was established in September 2010 as a charitable 
Foundation under German law1. In this kind of legal entity, the will of the founders cannot be altered 
subsequently and contributors are afforded strong voting rights. The main project of TDF is 
LibreOffice, an OSS office suite containing programs for word processing, spreadsheets, slideshows, 
diagrams & drawings. In order to reduce organizational overheads and cost, people from the US who 
want to contribute to LibreOffice financially can do so via SPI, which handles the general fund-
raising process for LibreOffice in North America, or directly to TDF. 
                                                     
1 https://www.documentfoundation.org/governance/board/  
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Reasons for this decision: The structure of TDF is unique in so far as the will of the founders cannot 
be altered subsequently. It comprises a board of trustees, a membership committee and a board of 
directors in which only individuals – not organizations –, may take a seat (Document Foundation, 
2012). Although SPI handles the fund-raising process, it does not interfere with the structure or other 
processes of LibreOffice as other foundations do: “The projects are independent from SPI, they are 
not part of SPI, and they are not member projects. So, we call that associated projects because they 
are independent but we provide some service for them […] they are not part of SPI and it's different 
to a lot of other foundations” (P3). 
Analysis of this decision (advantages): The legal structure of TDF is unique for an OSS community, 
guaranteeing its members some unalterable rights, as stated by an interviewee (P5). As an example, 
TDF is required to notify members publicly of changes in the structure, decisions made, discussions 
within the board of directors, and conflicts of interests within TDF2. TDF has three independent 
executive bodies: the board of directors, the board of trustees and the membership committee. 
Membership of the board of trustees is open to everyone who has contributed substantially to the 
foundation. This body elects the board of directors, as well as the membership committee. Only 
individuals - not companies, associations or NPOs - are accepted in TDF. While there is an advisory 
board with companies, associations and NPOs on it, in formal terms this advisory board is not a body 
of the foundation and has no rights (Document Foundation, 2012). The board of directors prevents 
conflicts of interests within the foundation and is under an obligation to ensure that not more than 
one-third of the members of the board of directors, the membership committee and the advisory board 
are employed by a single company, organization, entity or affiliate (individual organizational 
structures). 
 Unlike the OpenOffice.org community, where all contributors have to sign a contributor’s 
agreement, LibreOffice does not have such a requirement. Nevertheless, contributors to LibreOffice 
have to make a clear license statement such as “All of my past & future contributions to LibreOffice 
may be licensed under the MPLv2/LGPLv3+ dual license3.” Compared to other OSS communities, 
the entry barrier of contributing to LibreOffice is lower. “We log that and make sure that everyone 
has a clear e-mail-statement of that form. It's quite easy, there's a very low barrier to entry. Send one 
e-mail and you're done” (P4). As another interviewee stated, this simple license statement is helpful 
in getting more contributions, compared to the situation in other OSS foundations where a developer 
has to sign a contributor's agreement: “There you’ll get two pages which you have to read and sign 
and you may not understand them. In this case, you will lose around 50% of the contributions. Then, 
of course, there are the people who say that they do not fill it out on principle” (P5), (individual 
organizational processes). 
 LibreOffice benefits also from the funding and reimbursement processes, which SPI carries 
out on their behalf. As stated by an interviewee, SPI provides a lightweight funding and 
reimbursement process for donations without many restrictions. For LibreOffice, this is ideal because 
control over what happens with the money remains with them while SPI handles the entire process. 
SPI accepts donations, holds funds, and keeps the accounts on behalf of LibreOffice. SPI charges 5% 
of the donations for this service. “If someone goes to a conference and they want to have their flight 
or something reimbursed – that’s like the bulk of what SPI does and it is not very interesting work 
processing reimbursements and receipts and stuff” (P3). However, if LibreOffice were to accept 
donations e.g. from the United States without the help of SPI, the cost would be higher and specific 
knowledge would be needed (shared cost). 
                                                     
2 https://www.documentfoundation.org/satzung.pdf  
3 https://wiki.documentfoundation.org/Development/Developers  
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Analysis of this decision (disadvantages): Forking OpenOffice.org and creating LibreOffice was a 
highly risky endeavor and it was not clear if it would be a runaway success, as one interviewee stated 
(P4). There was not only the risk of the fork itself, but also that of incorporating the community as a 
foundation in Germany. As one interviewee explained, obtaining the status of “Stiftung” was hard and 
the statutes of TDF needed to be altered several times. As P6 explained, the German legal entity 
called “Stiftung” was new in the context of OSS where different founders build the legal entity. In the 
end, the status of “Stiftung” was chosen because it guarantees unalterable rights for its members 
(organizational risk).  
 Building the new legal entity took several months and involved a large volume of 
administrative tasks, such as coordination and communication. As an example, EUR 50,000 was 
needed in order to incorporate as a “Stiftung” in Germany (P6). At that point, it was not clear - even 
among core members - if the community would be able to collect the money: “At this point I thought, 
this was a ridiculous thing to ask people to give money […]. But people gave it” (P4), (high initial 
cost).  
 Building structures, processes and the IT-infrastructure are some examples of the unavoidable 
expenses LibreOffice incurred. TDF owns some servers and rents others, spending between 
EUR 50,000 – EUR 60,000 annually to maintain its IT-infrastructure4. TDF employs around 10 
people, three of them almost full-time. These three TDF employees work on marketing, 
administration and release management. Freelancers work on IT-infrastructure management, 
community management and accounting, but nobody is employed as a software engineer (costly 
overheads).  
 
4.3 The Case of PostgreSQL 
PostgreSQL is an object-relational database system developed by a team of mostly volunteer 
developers at the University of California in Berkeley. In 1996, PostgreSQL was made public as OSS 
when a group of developers outside the University recognized the potential of the system. While the 
PostgreSQL community meanwhile encompasses several non-profit corporations, these entities do not 
own any PostgreSQL code. Therefore, PostgreSQL is not controlled by any company. A committee of 
five to seven senior contributors sets release dates, handles confidential matters, acts as spokespeople 
and arbitrates community decisions that are not settled by consensus.  
Originally, donors of the PostgreSQL community could donate either to the European (PgEU) or to 
the US American PostgreSQL NPO (PgUS). Both NPOs used the funds received for their respective 
area5. However, because the PostgreSQL community is not limited to those two regions, they needed 
a way to generate funds globally. 
Decision: PostgreSQL decided to use the services of SPI for funding and reimbursement processes 
without geographical limitation. As an affiliated community of SPI, PostgreSQL is now able to accept 
donations and raise funds with less restrictions compared to their pre-existing NPOs. 
Reasons for this decision: As described in an interview (P1), PostgreSQL could have chosen other 
foundations to handle the funding process. However, other foundations ask for more control and set 
restrictions in terms of processes and structures. SPI, on the other hand, does not interfere with 
processes or structures. Moreover, SPI has a fairly low level of bureaucracy.  
                                                     
4 https://wiki.documentfoundation.org/images/f/f2/Accounts-2016-12.ods  
5 https://www.postgresql.org/about/donate/  
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Analysis of this decision (advantages): Although PostgreSQL could have integrated with several 
other established foundations, the community decided not to join those because they would have been 
forced to adapt their structure: “We looked at their governance structure, we looked at our 
governance structure […] We couldn't understand how their governance structure would work with 
our project. Because they usually have very hierarchical structures. And we felt that our project 
worked really well as it was and we really didn't want to change that” (P2), (individual organizational 
structures).  
 Instead of setting up a new foundation to collect funds without geographical limitation, such 
services are now obtained from SPI. This means, PostgreSQL is able to use the services of an existing 
foundation with similar long-term goals. Consequently, cost savings were possible by utilizing 
synergies as in the case of LibreOffice and to the same price (out-of-the-box principles).  
Analysis of this decision (disadvantages): Although the PostgreSQL community uses some services 
of SPI, they still are different legal entities. Originally, the PostgreSQL Foundation Inc. was founded, 
but failed to be granted non-profit status by the internal revenue service (IRS), and was terminated in 
2006. In 2009, the United States PostgreSQL Association succeeded in obtaining exempt status from 
the IRS. This was not only a risky endeavor, but also an expensive one (high initial cost). 
 
4.4 The Case of PolarSys and the Eclipse Foundation 
In 2009, the Open Platform for the Engineering of Embedded Systems (OPEES) was created to 
support specific issues encountered by industrial users of embedded systems, such as long-term 
support and maturity assessment for software. Such software often needs to be maintained for a very 
long time because those systems may be in use for decades (Lundell et al., 2011). Satellites, for 
example, need support for more than 25 years. A similar case are aircraft flight control systems and 
the tools used to create software for them. If the vendor of such software leaves the market or decides 
to support the software no longer, future maintenance of the software becomes uncertain. The OSS 
development model helps to solve this problem by opening up the source code, thus enabling other 
companies to provide services. “With classical proprietary software, there's no company which can 
maintain it for decades. So that's a very big issue and open source is a way to resolve it” (P7). By 
starting an OSS community the people behind PolarSys intended to increase transparency, 
collaboration and meritocracy in order to form a sustainable ecosystem for support, professional 
services and other benefits (Blondelle et al., 2013). 
Decision: Because OPEES members saw OSS as a way to ensure long-term support availability, they 
decided in 2011 to join forces with the Eclipse Foundation to create the PolarSys Industry Working 
Group of Eclipse (Blondelle et al., 2013). Core areas of PolarSys are the aerospace industry, defence 
and security, the energy sector, healthcare, telecommunications and transportation. The goal of 
PolarSys is to facilitate collaboration between end user companies and to develop an ecosystem 
around its tools. PolarSys chose to integrate their community with the Eclipse Foundation as their first 
working group. 
Reasons for this decision: As Blondelle (2012) describes, PolarSys was created as a working group 
within the Eclipse Foundation because “it is easier to claim we build a sustainable entity to ensure 
long-term availability of software by joining a Foundation that has proven to be sustainable for ten 
years.” Sophisticated specifications by PolarSys increase the stability and longevity of the entire 
Eclipse infrastructure because other working groups inside the Eclipse Foundation deal with the same 
problem of long-term support for their systems. Finally, OPEES members saw the Eclipse Foundation 
as a well-respected organization having established processes, which could be used jointly.  
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Analysis of this decision (advantages): PolarSys can host projects on the infrastructure of Eclipse, 
such as Git repositories, issue tracking systems, mailing lists, and download sites without setting up 
their own infrastructure or having to maintain it. Thus, PolarSys has outsourced these activities to the 
Eclipse Foundation. The actual cost of the services provided is modular and depends on the services 
required by PolarSys. The following statement sums up the key elements of what is referred to as 
“out-of-the-box-principles”: “In an own ecosystem you need to create your own processes, your own 
marketing events; you need to create your own infrastructure, that's very expensive and time 
consuming because you start from scratch. By being under the umbrella of the Eclipse Foundation, 
it's less expensive and we can go forward faster” (P7), (out-of-the-box principles). 
 As a result, PolarSys can concentrate on what is most interesting for them without having to 
care for supporting and management processes provided by the Eclipse Foundation. Thus, PolarSys is 
able to set a clear focus on its core business of software development (focus on core activities).  
 PolarSys is co-using the existing bylaws of the Eclipse Foundation, which cannot be changed 
by its working groups. The result is a shorter time-to-market because existing structures and processes 
can be used as a framework. As P5 explained, if five big companies need to work out their own 
bylaws, this process can take up to three years, since the lawyers of the five companies must establish 
and agree on the bylaws (existing bylaws).  
 PolarSys can also save by utilizing synergies. As stated in one interview, if PolarSys needs 
more resources, the Eclipse Foundation can employ new people, who may work both for the 
foundation and for PolarSys. In fact, an additional product manager was hired and the cost of this 
person is shared between the Eclipse Foundation and PolarSys. If PolarSys needs to have a high 
volume of code checked to verify that it is IP-clean, they can employ a new person together with the 
Eclipse Foundation and share the cost. Sharing such cost reduces administrative overheads by buying 
these common services from the Eclipse Foundation. Moreover, PolarSys benefits both from the 
experience and the services provided and therefore has more resources available for the software 
development (shared cost). 
 The Eclipse Foundation already had a reputation and a thriving community from which 
PolarSys could benefit. While it takes a substantial effort for a community to establish itself and raise 
its profile, PolarSys can use the visibility of the Eclipse Foundation as a marketing advantage. 
PolarSys benefits from organized workshops, conferences, webinars or member meetings organized 
by the Eclipse Foundation. Such events can be used to enlarge the community and boost interest in 
PolarSys. As one interviewee stated, this cross-fertilization via the Eclipse Foundation and its working 
groups can help PolarSys to find new volunteers and market their software (P8). Moreover, the 
Eclipse Foundation often provides its working groups with exhibition areas and infrastructure at 
conferences and summits. Such occasions give PolarSys an opportunity to meet developers from the 
various participating firms (visibility of umbrella organization).  
Analysis of this decision (disadvantages): PolarSys had to accept the bylaws of the Eclipse 
Foundation. This is a prerequisite of becoming a working group and can be changed only with a 2/3 
majority of the Eclipse board of directors. 
PolarSys relies upon the support by the Eclipse Foundation on a legal and marketing level, as 
well as on a technical level in terms of providing the IT-infrastructure. However, according to one 
interviewee, since PolarSys is not itself involved directly in the IT-infrastructure, this makes it more 
difficult to adapt it to its own needs; instead, PolarSys has to deal with the Eclipse Foundation and 
find a compromise. “So today we have to follow the IP process and in some projects, they want to 
take some shortcuts and then the Eclipse Foundation says that they cannot” (P7).  
 Applicants for membership of PolarSys have to go through a rather complicated process due 
to the two-tiered structure of the integrated organization. An applicant may not register for PolarSys 
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until he has signed up with the Eclipse Foundation. Also, as stated by one interviewee, the division of 
responsibilities and tasks between PolarSys and the Eclipse Foundation frequently requires 
consultations with the Eclipse Foundation before carrying out specific actions and processes. On the 
other hand, the Eclipse Foundation profits from its working groups, illustrated e.g. by the Very Long 
Term Support (Blondelle et al., 2013) of PolarSys: since one of the main aims of PolarSys is to 
provide OSS maintenance over several decades, the Eclipse Foundation also benefits from the 
specifications and infrastructure which PolarSys requires. Moreover, the Eclipse Foundation receives 
payment from its working groups in return for the provision of “out-of-the-box-principles” 
(organizational interdependencies). 
 The Eclipse Foundation requires the licensing of software under the Eclipse Public License 
(EPL), and PolarSys had to accept this (Eclipse Foundation, 2003). Dual-licensing is permitted only 
with the approval of the board of the Eclipse Foundation (restricted license-choice).  
 
4.5 Aggregation of Findings 
In the four cases, we have identified arguments for and against choosing either autonomous or 
integrated forms of associated collaborations. Figure 2 illustrates these arguments; on the positive side 
(white background), we have the advantages of the given approach, on the negative side (dark 
background) are the disadvantages. 
 
Figure 2: Advantages and disadvantages of inter-organizational affiliation of OSS communities. 
 
 
Our main findings are summarized in Table 1, providing a brief description of each argument for or 
against the autonomous or integrated approach. 
 
Category Argument Short description 
Advantages of the 
autonomous approach 
Individual organizational processes A community can set up its own processes and is not dependent on any 
established procedures of another organization.  
Individual organizational structures A community can build its own organizational structures and does not need 
to adapt to an existing hierarchy. 
Strong identification with the 
community 
The members identify themselves strongly with the technical and 
organizational goals of the community. 
Disadvantages of the 
autonomous approach 
Organizational risk In building the new legal entity, the community faces some risks, such as 
failing to establish bylaws or failing to obtain a desired legal status. 
High initial cost The community needs to set up a new legal entity, which results in high cost 
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when starting its activities. 
Costly overheads The community has to spend money on administrative work and 
infrastructure management in order to keep itself running. 
Advantages of the 
integrated approach 
Out-of-the-box principles The community can adopt proven and tested services and structures of other 
organizations. 
Existing bylaws A community can co-use existing rules, structures and processes, thus 
saving time and money. 
Focus on core activities As a result of using out-of-the-box principles, a community can focus on 
software development, thus avoiding to spend time and money for activities, 
which are not at the center of its interest. 
Shared cost The community can share cost with other communities. 
Visibility of umbrella organization A community can benefit from the visibility and reputation of an existing 
foundation, e.g. to get new contributors or to market itself. 
Disadvantages of the 
integrated approach 
Organizational interdependencies A community has to accept certain given structures and processes in order to 
integrate itself into an existing foundation. 
Restricted license-choice A community may be restricted in its choice of license as a consequence of 
integrating itself into an existing foundation. 





Starting from our desire to understand why different forms of mature OSS communities exist, we 
proceed to answer the two research questions at the beginning of this paper carving out the distinct 
advantages and disadvantages of different forms of inter-organizational affiliations of OSS 
communities. As our analysis shows, there is no “one size fits all” rule for or against joining an 
umbrella organization. Different forms of OSS communities exist because there are good reasons for 
both, the autonomous and the integrated approach of community governance. In addition, the 
interjacent forms of associated approaches are encountered, leading to even more forms of OSS 
community governance. Such mixed governance forms intend to profit from the positive aspects of 
both extreme positions. Our findings indicate that the choice of approach depends on the specific 
circumstances: Communities choosing the autonomous approach give more weight to arguments for 
organizational autonomy and individuality whereas the communities preferring the integrated 
approach of organizational affiliation emphasize the possible cost reduction and efficiency. 
Furthermore, we find that all arguments extracted from the interviews and governance 
documents may be related to the two established management theories we identified by analyzing the 
research stream of NPO literature. RDT suggests that organizations collaborate to secure critical 
resources. However, such collaboration is not without cost. The most severe factor is arguably the loss 
of operating autonomy (Provan, 1984). Therefore, a key challenge for an organization in choosing 
among different forms of collaboration is keeping the dynamic balance between managing resource 
dependence and sustaining organizational autonomy (Gray and Wood, 1991). According to RDT, 
communities taking the autonomous approach favor sustaining organizational autonomy over 
managing resource dependence (Gray and Wood, 1991). However, as our case studies show, 
organizational autonomy means high initial as well as recurring cost. Autonomous communities have 
to build a legal entity on their own, which is cost and time intensive. Moreover, recurring cost cannot 
be shared with other communities. Therefore, the autonomous approach is usually more costly than 
the integrated approach. 
 If the community seeks to reduce their overhead expenses, cooperation with other 
communities might make sense. TCE suggests that organizations in general cooperate because their 
partners provide an opportunity to reduce transaction cost (Williamson, 1975). According to TCE, a 
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given product or service can be obtained either from within an organization or it can be bought from 
another organization. The decision as to which of the two options is more advantageous depends on 
the transaction cost associated with each (Williamson, 1975). In the context of OSS communities, 
common services such as bookkeeping or services related to funding can be obtained from specialized 
providers, such as OSS foundations. By providing these services to a number of communities and, 
consequently, achieving cost savings, OSS foundations can offer a market price which may be less 
than the cost to communities performing the services on their own.  
 In the associated approach of inter-organizational affiliations, OSS communities hope to 
achieve cost reductions by buying services from the market. According to TCE, they decide to buy 
services because the necessary transaction cost of acquiring the services in-house (hierarchy) are 
higher than the price of an external provider (market). In the case of donation handling, e.g. know-
how required to collect and handle the money differs globally and specific knowledge is needed for 
this task. Specialized market players such as OSS foundations therefore sell such services at a more 
favorable price lowering transaction cost. 
 Another way for OSS communities to reduce their cost is the integrated approach of inter-
organizational affiliation. In this approach, communities do not just buy services from an existing 
foundation, they actually become an integrated part of the OSS foundation. Upon integrating, 
communities benefit from the services and structures provided and can share the cost. However, such 
forms of collaboration have a price, too. Communities integrating into an existing OSS foundation 
prefer the ability to secure critical resources over organizational autonomy and therefore not only pay 
money for the provided services, but also give up some of their organizational autonomy in exchange 
for interdependencies with the OSS umbrella organization leading to restrictions, as explained in RDT 
(Provan, 1984). Communities are required to accept certain conditions defined by their umbrella 
organization and they have to rely on support by the parent entity, e.g. using its IT infrastructure, 
applying its bylaws or integrating predefined processes. 
 
6. Discussion 
In this final section, we elaborate on the implications of our findings, their limitations and possible 
future research in the area of OSS community governance. 
 
6.1 Implications for Practitioners and Researchers 
The results of this study provide useful information for practitioners. First, the results of our study can 
provide guidance for OSS community leaders regarding the choice of how to govern the project. They 
can obtain an overview of potential advantages and disadvantages of collaborating with existing OSS 
foundations as compared to setting up their own foundation and, on this basis, decide which of the 
different approaches meets their needs best. E.g. they can use our results as a list of arguments to 
decide whether to be autonomous, integrated or to use an interjacent strategy.  
Second, existing OSS foundations can try to focus on reducing their disadvantages in order to 
attract additional OSS communities. We believe our results encourage existing foundations to see the 
advantages and disadvantages of their business model from a more systematic point of view. 
Moreover, our results might help umbrella organizations to empathize better with their members who 
pay for the services provided not only in terms of money but also in terms of a loss of autonomy. 
Third, as our case studies on GENIVI and PolarSys showed, companies from certain sectors 
collaborate increasingly on software platforms by applying the OSS development model. Such 
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industry-specific OSS communities have been called “super-communities” by the initiators of 
PolarSys pointing out the strengths of focusing on professional services and other industry-related 
benefits (Blondelle et al., 2013). Those communities in particular have to decide whether they want to 
be governed autonomously like the GENIVI community, or if they should better integrate with an 
existing umbrella organization like PolarSys joining the Eclipse Foundation. Our results provide 
guidance on this strategically relevant decision. 
 With respect to researchers, the present study has two main theoretical implications: First, we 
have analyzed the situation of OSS communities intending to improve their governance. Unlike 
previous studies (e.g. Riehle and Berschneider 2012) our unit of analysis was not the foundation but 
the OSS community. Therefore, our results are new to OSS research shedding light on issues of OSS 
governance. This is especially important to better understand different forms of governance on a 
macro-level. 
Second, we have analyzed the decisions of OSS communities and their arguments for them 
through the lenses of RDT and TCE. Thus, we are able to explain the underlying motivation from the 
perspective of established economic management theories. Each of the advantages and disadvantages 
identified by our qualitative empirical analysis relates to core elements of RDT or TCE. Therefore, we 




Our research has a number of limitations which may affect the validity of our results. First, construct 
validity reflects the extent to which the studied operational measures reflect what the researcher 
intended to study according to the research goals. Research question 1 assumes OSS communities can 
choose among three different options in order to govern their community. However, the analyzed 
communities represent only a small subset of possible case studies and therefore do not necessarily 
show all possible approaches on how collaboration with OSS foundations could be achieved.  
Second, internal validity is relevant if causal relations are examined. We do not argue for 
causal relations but for circumstantial factors, which may play a role when choosing between different 
forms of collaboration. Although we have used two different sources of data (interviews and publicly 
accessible documents) over a prolonged period of time, the internal validity of our results could be 
improved in future research. In particular, sampling within a community should be carefully 
considered in order to take into account the different perspectives of the various roles of an OSS 
community. 
Third, external validity is concerned with the extent to which findings can be generalized. Our 
study analyzed four OSS communities fairly large in terms of contributors while many other OSS 
communities are much smaller. Moreover, the analyzed communities are only a little subset of 
possible case studies and therefore do not necessarily show all possible approaches to collaboration 
with OSS foundations. Therefore, our study does not aim for completeness but for theory 
construction. 
Fourth, reliability is affected by the extent to which the data and the analysis are dependent on 
a specific researcher. In order to enhance reliability, the data analysis has been discussed by two 
persons. Although we felt saturation was reached after analyzing 4 communities and conducting 16 
interviews, other researchers could possibly reveal further findings by analyzing more communities. 
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6.3 Future Research and Outlook 
As the implications and limitations indicate, there is potential for future research in the area of inter-
organizational affiliations of OSS communities. On one hand, our findings could be tested in a 
quantitative research design e.g. by means of a survey of leaders of OSS communities verifying the 
arguments regarding inter-organizational affiliation. In such a survey, questions could be asked 
regarding the effects of legal structures on the success of OSS communities: How is efficiency and 
durability of OSS communities influenced by their inter-organizational affiliation? How does joining 
an umbrella organization affect the motivation of individual developers? From what services of 
umbrella or associated organizations does the OSS community benefit most? 
On the other hand, additional in-depth qualitative research could reveal the relationship 
between characteristics of OSS software products (development process models, etc.) and the 
different forms of OSS community governance. This would allow analyzing the impact of decision-
making in OSS development towards the choice of inter-organizational affiliation and vice-versa, how 
the different forms of OSS community governance influence decision-making processes in OSS 
development. 
Finally, it would be interesting to better understand the interjacent strategy intending to obtain 
the advantages of both, the autonomous and the integrated approach. If it is indeed possible to benefit 
from synergies of simultaneously managing several OSS communities while maintaining legal 
independence, then why would not more OSS communities choose such a support organization? 
Interestingly, there is one exceptionally successful umbrella organization following this interjacent 
strategy, the Linux Foundation. As of June 2018, it has already more than 1000 corporate members6 
and provides hosting for more than 100 OSS communities7. Frequently new corporations and OSS 
communities working on leading edge technology such as artificial intelligence and Blockchain join 
the Linux Foundation (The Linux Foundation, 2018) increasing its influence and power. It is therefore 
of great interest for future research to investigate how this particular umbrella organization starting 
from one single OSS project, the Linux Kernel, has achieved becoming the home of many dozens of 
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# Name, function, association Type Date Focus of questions 




2017-02-15 Organizational structure, association with SPI 
P2 Bruce Momjian, Core Team 
member PostgreSQL 
Skype call 2017-03-13 Organizational structure, reasons to integrate, software development 
process 
P3 Martin Michlmayr, President of 
Software in the Public Interest 
Skype call 2017-03-10 Organizational structure, reasons for founding, autonomous vs. 
integrated OSS organizations 
P4 Michael Meeks, Deputy Chairman 




2016-12-13 Organizational structure, reasons for founding, autonomous vs. 
integrated OSS organizations, software development process 
P5 Thorsten Behrens, Board of 
Directors, TDF 
Skype call 2016-12-16 Organizational structure, reasons for founding, autonomous vs. 
integrated OSS organizations 
P6 Florian Effenberger, Executive 
Director of TDF 
Phone call 2016-12-22 Organizational structure, reasons for founding, autonomous vs. 
integrated OSS organizations, funding process, organizational structure 
P7 Etienne Juliot, elected 
participating member 
representative, PolarSys 
In person 2015-11-03 Founding reasons, reasons to integrate, advantages and disadvantages of 
PolarSys being in the Eclipse Foundation, contributors 
P8 Ralph Mueller, Managing Director 
Europe, Eclipse Foundation 
Phone call 2014-11-20 Organizational structure, reasons for founding, autonomous vs. 
integrated OSS organizations, future of OSS community 
P8 Ralph Mueller, Managing Director 
Europe, Eclipse Foundation 
Skype call 2016-05-04 Organizational structure, reasons for founding, autonomous vs. 
integrated OSS organizations 
P9 Gaël Blondelle, Director of 
European Ecosystem 
Development, Eclipse Foundation 
and PolarSys expert 
In person 2015-11-02 Founding reasons of PolarSys, organizational structure, long-term-
support, difficulties 
P10 Dominique Toupin, representing 
Ericsson and chairman of the 
GENIVI Alliance 
In person 2015-11-03 Long-Term-Support, dependencies on the Eclipse Foundation, 
advantages and disadvantages of being in the Eclipse Foundation, crucial 
points in the beginning 
P11 Claus-Peter Wiedemann, Lead 
License Review Team, GENIVI 
Alliance 
Phone call 2014-11-21 Tasks, license review team, coopetition, competition with similar 
organizations, future of OSS community 
P12 Jeremiah Foster, Community 
manager, GENIVI Alliance 
Skype call 2014-11-11 User-driven vs. developer-driven OSS communities, free-riding, content 
of contributed software, future of OSS community 
P12 Jeremiah Foster, Community 




2015-11-17 Code quality of GENIVI, contributors, founding and financial situation, 
coopetition, comparisons to Linux Foundation 
P13 Steve Crumb, Executive Director, 
GENIVI Alliance 
Skype call 2014-10-23 Organizational structure, reasons for founding, coopetition, funding, 
free-riding, expected influence on automotive industry 
P14 Joel Hoffmann, Director of 
Marketing and Board Director of 
GENIVI 
Skype call 2015-12-01 Founding GENIVI community, automotive industry, reasons and goals 
of the alliance, comparisons to Linux Foundation 




Association Document type Title Reason for 
inclusion 
Pages Date Available on 
GENIVI Legal Bylaws Governance 
Description 
37 10/2011 www.genivi.org 
GENIVI Legal Intellectual Property Rights Policy Legal 
Description 
13 02/2012 www.genivi.org 
GENIVI Legal Participation Agreement Governance 
Description 
2 01/2012 www.genivi.org 
GENIVI Legal Public Policy for GENIVI Licensing and 
Copyright Version 2.0 
Legal 
Description 
15 n.a. www.genivi.org 
 22 
GENIVI Organizational 1. Functional Organization Chart 
2. Instructions for Obtaining Membership 
3. Membership Value  
4. Compliance Programs 
Governance 
Description 




Eclipse Legal Eclipse Bylaws Governance 
Description 
23 08/2011 www.eclipse.org 
Eclipse Legal Eclipse Intellectual Property Rights Legal 
Description 
11 07/2011 www.eclipse.org 
Eclipse Legal Eclipse Membership Agreement Governance 
Description 
11 04/2008 www.eclipse.org 
Eclipse Legal Eclipse Public License V 1.0 Legal 
Description 
4 04/2009 www.eclipse.org 




8 02/2012 www.eclipse.org 
Eclipse Organizational Eclipse Types of Membership Governance 
Description 
n.a. n.a. www.eclipse.org 
Eclipse Organizational Eclipse Membership Rights Governance 
Description 
n.a. n.a. www.eclipse.org 
Eclipse Organizational PolarSys working group Charter Governance 
Description 
n.a. 12/2015 www.eclipse.org 
Eclipse Organizational PolarSys Members Governance 
Description 
n.a. n.a. www.polarsys.org 
Eclipse Organizational PolarSys/TLP Proposal Governance 
Description 
n.a. 09/2012 www.eclipse.org 
Eclipse Organizational 2014 Annual Eclipse Community Report Financial 
Overview 
n.a. 06/2014 www.eclipse.org 


















TDF Legal Licenses in TDF Legal 
Description 
n.a. n.a. www.libreoffice.org 
PostgreSQL Organizational IRS exempt status  Legal 
Description 
2 04/2009 www.postgresql.us 
PostgreSQL Organizational Project and Release Management Governance 
Description 
43 05/2008 www.pgcon.org 
SPI Organizational Annual reports 2003-2016 Financial 
Overview 
n.a. n.a. www.spi-inc.org 
SPI Legal Bylaws Governance 
Description 
n.a. 08/2016 www.spi-inc.org 
SPI Organizational Services Governance 
Description 
n.a. n.a. www.spi-inc.org 
SPI Organizational Associated Projects how to Governance 
Description 
n.a. n.a. www.spi-inc.org 




Question from the interview questionnaire Reason for question 
Were there any alternatives than founding your own legal 
entity? 
Focus on different forms of community governance according to our first research 
question. 
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What were the reasons to found your own organization? Focus on the advantages of the autonomous approach.  
What were the crucial points to join XYZ? Focus on the advantages of the integrated or associated approach. 
How do you profit from reusing resources from XYZ? Focus on the advantages of the integrated or associated approach. 
What were your experiences providing these services on 
your own? 
Focus on the disadvantages of the autonomous approach. 
What are the dependencies between your community and 
XYZ? 
Focus on the disadvantages of the integrated or associated approach. 
How did it come that you work together with XYZ? Focus on the history of the collaboration of the community and the umbrella 
organization. 
Appendix 3: Excerpt of the interview questionnaire. 
 
